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Abstract:  It has been widely argued recently that agriculture is undergoing a process of vertical
integration with allied industries.  One of the worldwide ways of vertical integration in agricul-
ture is contract farming.  Contract farming is a continually evolving process.  Worldwide appli-
cations of contract farming have shown that the terms of contracts are shaped by their own con-
ditions and varied from product to product.  Also, each country has its own experiences.
Contract farming has many advantages for both producers/growers and integrators, besides some
inherent disadvantages and failures regarding its implementation.  Some measures, however,
could be taken to outweigh these advantages for both sides.
In this study, first of all, a brief history is presented along with an explanation of contract farm-
ing concepts.  Secondly, the reasons behind contract farming are discussed.  And, successes and
failures of contract farming are analyzed based on several research works and articles.  Finally a
simplified model is presented for the success of private contractual arrangements in the light of 
evidence taken from the experiences on the world.1
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN
AGRICULTURE AND CONTRACT FARMING
1.  Introduction
Firm activities, firms, industries and countries as a whole are interrelated and are in close
relationship to some extent.  The way and intensity of the relationship have been changing and
evolving in a historical perspective.  These relations, which are conceptualized as institutional
and technological, are closely related to intended aims, socio-economic structure of the partners,
etc.  Nowadays there is a fast growing integration among firms, industries and countries for
different purposes such as political, military and mainly economic.  When integration is taken
among firms in an industry, vertical integration is given an importance and consideration.  It has
been widely argued that recently agriculture is undergoing a process of vertical integration with
allied industries, and that consequently the control of agriculture in the future may not rest
within the industry itself (Trifon 1959).  There will be more reliance on vertical coordination
and contract production and producers will be less independent than today’s farmer (Harryman
1994).
In this article the concepts of vertical coordination and integration are focused on and
contract farming is examined rather comprehensively as a means of vertical integration.
2.  Inter-firm Relations in Agriculture and Vertical Integration
Primitive agriculture was a fully integrated system itself.  In  a subsistence agriculture,
vertical integration is nearly complete since most of the production resources and production
decisions are in the same hands (Penn 1958).  One family would collect seed, sow and reap a
crop, rear and fatten an animal, and themselves consume the produce after reserving seed or
breeding stock for the following year.  The evolution from subsistence farming to the present2
market oriented agricultural system has been marked by a gradual disintegration of functions. 
Specialization is one of the distinguishing features of present commercialized agriculture.
Agriculture as a production industry is closely related to marketing activities which
transform, transport and transfer food and fiber to the consumer.  Additionally agriculture is
served by a large number of industries which are supplying farm inputs.  Coordination and/or
integration between farms and the other firms in the industry, both forward and backward, is
inevitable now.  In advanced agriculture, however, there are now strong indications that the
tendency is toward integration.  The main reasons of this reversal are, of course, changes in
market structure (born of supermarket revaluation) and the upsurge of high technology in
farming (Barker 1972).
Integration means bringing together two or more parts into one.  There are three basic
kinds of integration.  Vertical integration occurs when a firm combines activities unlike those it
currently performs which are related to them in the sequence of marketing and production activ-
ities.  Such integration could be illustrated by the meatpacker who decides to reach both back-
ward toward the producer and operate his own livestock buying points in the countryside and
forward toward the consumer and operate his own meat wholesaling firm.  Horizontal integra-
tion occurs when a firm gains control over the firms performing similar activities at the same
level in the production and marketing sequence.  The local dairy cooperatives which are brought
under a regional union is one example.  Vertical integration is best reserved for ownership
integration where two or more stages in the process of production and marketing are effectively
controlled by a single management.  This term is related to a technological rather than an institu-
tional development (Trifon 1959).3
Firms often expand both vertically and horizontally.  If both vertical and horizontal
operations are tied together, this is called circular integration.  When there is organization of
dairy farmers under a dairy cooperative, a vertical integration has appeared; at the same time if
dairy cooperatives are organized under a regional cooperative union, a horizontal integration has
occurred.
There is another type of organizational expansion which occurs when agencies or activi-
ties that do not have any direct relations among them are brought under a unified management. 
It is called conglomeration.
Another way to review integration in one industry is by studying the extent of the trans-
fer of decisions and the ownership of the firm assets.  When all the decisions and assets of the
firms are taken under a single firm control, that ownership is called ownership integration or
merger.  In contrast when each firm retains its separate identity but leaves one or more decisions
of production and/or marketing to the control of another firm that is called quasi integration or
contract integration.
On the other hand the terms vertical coordination, vertical integration and contract pro-
duction are often used interchangeably (Cramer and Jensen 1988; Paarlberg 1995).  Of course
vertical coordination is a rather broad term which encompasses all means of harmonizing
vertically interdependent production and marketing activities ranging from spot markets through
various types of contracts to complete integration (Frank and Henderson 1992).  In agriculture
four types of vertical coordination between farmers and off-farm businesses are generally
recognized.
i.  Coordination Without Any Contract:  This is named a spot market or open market
transaction.  In this relationship there is no written or oral contract between the firm and the4
farmer for both buying and selling.  In this type of coordination, the farmer buys supplies from
whom he chooses and sells his products to whoever will give the best price.  This type of inte-
gration does provide freedom to farmers but uncertainties both in buying supplies and selling
produce are the main drawback.
ii.  Contract Farming:  Contract farming is sometimes called quasi integration.  British
and American approaches are different in this subject.  The British view has drawn a sharp dis-
tinction between contract farming and vertical integration and they see one as an alternative of
the other (Barker 1972).  They prefer to restrict the meaning of vertical integration to what has
been called “ownership integration.”  American practice, in particular, has been to regard con-
tract farming as a form of vertical integration (Allen 1972).  Contract farming is going to be
examined in detail in the remainder of this article.
iii.  Ownership Integration:  In this type of integration, each individual farm loses its
identity and becomes a company-owned farm.  The company owns or leases the land, buildings
and equipment and has its own employees.
iv.  Farmer Cooperatives:  An agricultural cooperative is an organization usually incor-
porated, owned and controlled by agricultural producers, which operates for the mutual benefit
of its members as producers or patrons (Rehber 1984).  One worldwide way of vertical coordina-
tion is of course cooperative organizations.
3. Contract Farming
3. 1  History and Concepts of Contract Farming
These sort of vertically coordinated production relations are not new, since contracts
were employed by the Japanese colonial state for sugar production in Taiwan in the period after5
1885 and by the USA banana companies in central America in the early part of the twentieth
century (Watts 1994).  By the late twentieth century, however, across much of Western Europe
(the earliest record of forward purchase agreement is dated 1878 (Barker 1972)), North America
and Japan, contract farming became an integral part of the food and fiber industry.  In advanced
capitalist states, it seems that contract farming was widely used by the vegetable canning indus-
try in North America and by the seed industry in Western Europe in the 1930s and 1940s.
Contracts in a general and incomplete sense are found in agriculture everywhere in ex-
tremely heterogeneous forms.  Simple market specification contracts or future purchase agree-
ments (typically determining price, quantity and time of delivery) are common and labor con-
tracting, supplying labor and machinery have a wide application in agriculture (Wright 1989).
Contract farming or contract production, however, must be distinguished from the
multiplicity of simple marketing or labor contracts.  Specifically contract farming entails rela-
tions between growers and private or state enterprise that substitute for spot market transactions
between family farms and a processing, export or purchasing unit.  A standard farming contract
regulates in advance price, production practices, product quality and credit facilities, etc.
Arriving at a meaningful definition of contract farming is rather difficult.  The one
classic definition provided by Roy refers to contractual arrangement between farmers and other
firms, whether oral or written, specifying one or more conditions of production and/or marketing
of an agricultural product (Roy 1963).  Roy’s definition is perhaps too broad since it would in-
clude a forward contract in which only price and volume are set.  Forward contracts that could
be sold and bought are not our interest here.  In the definition above, as excluding a marketing
arrangement such as forward contracts, two conditions must be added.  First that contracts
should be non-transferable and second that the term “and/or” should be replaced by “and,” that6
means the contract must specify one or more conditions of production and marketing (Glover
1984).
Contract farming has been promoted in the recent three decades as an institutional
innovation to improve agricultural performance in less developed countries, sometimes as a key
element of rural development and/or settlement projects (Ghee and Dorall 1992).  This system
was accepted and used as one of the promising institutional frameworks for the delivery of price
incentives, technology and other agricultural inputs.  Local governments, private local firms,
multinational companies, some international aid and lending agencies like the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Commonwealth
Development Corporation, have been involved in these contract farming schemes (Glover 1994).
However, worldwide applications in practice have caused to appear different terms and
connotations regarding contract farming in the related literature (Glover  1992).  Hence contract
farming is used only for a private sector scheme, while some other terms are used for different
applications as follows.
Outgrower Scheme:  Generally connotes a government scheme.  In this system govern-
ment usually has a public enterprise purchasing produce from farmers on its own or as part of a
joint venture with a private firm.  This term is frequently used in Africa and Asia.
Nucleus-Outgrower Scheme:  This is a variation of the outgrower scheme in which
there is a project authority which has or administers a plantation adjacent to the processing plant. 
This plant supplements its own plantation production by contracting in different proportions.
Satellite Farming:  This is also used in referring to any of the variations of the schemes
mentioned above.  On the other hand, the term multipartite arrangement is used to emphasize7
the scheme in which several actors such as private firms, government and foreign aid agencies
are involved.
Several types of contracts are distinguished according to the number of decisions influ-
enced, sharing of the risks and specifying contract terms.  From the production decision or
management point of view, two types of contracts are determined.
i.  Limited Management Contracts:  In this type the farmer signs a contract to get some
production inputs.  There is not any real guarantee for the price.  The farmer’s responsibility is
limited only for the production inputs which he has gotten under agreement.
ii.  Full Management Contracts:  In this case the farmer and the integrator firm have
made a contract based on a certain amount of production.  In this type of contract the farmer has
to follow some provisions specified in the agreement.  In this way, the producer provides a
certain market for his product and insures himself against risks.
Kohls has classified contracts into three broad categories (Kohls and Uhl 1985).
i.  Market Specification Contracts:  These simply specify some of the product quality
measures which will be acceptable to the integrator and also some regulations are placed on the
price and the method of payment.  Contracts are generally signed at planting time and specify
how much the integrator will buy and at what price.  Little or none of the farmer’s management
decisions are transferred.  From the producer viewpoint, they guarantee a buyer if the specifica-
tions are met.
ii.  Resource Providing Contracts:  In this type, the integrators provide production
resources with certain conditions and managerial help and supervision.  Product prices are
usually based upon the spot markets and income guarantees to the producers are minimal.8
iii.  Management and Income Guaranteeing Contracts:  These types of contracts
often include the production and marketing stipulations of the former two types.  In addition,
market and price risks are transferred from farmers to integrators in this type.  On the other
hand, the integrator takes a substantial part of the managerial responsibility of the farmers.
A fair contract should contain reciprocal obligations with a balance between the rewards
and the risks accruing to each party.  A production contract should at least contain the provisions
presented below:
i.  Define the parties.
ii.  Specify type and quality of the produce.
State the quantity of the produce.  Contracts could be signed on acreage or tonnage basis. 
Processors bear the yield risk if the contract is signed on an acreage basis.  In the other way,
farmers bear the yield risk.
State clearly the responsibilities of both parties concerning production and marketing
practices.
Indicate the manner, including timing, of delivery or collection.
Determine the price (specific or formula) or other consideration and indicate the effects
of variations in quality, quantity or manner of delivery and also specify the manner and timing
of payment.  Price is frequently left variable in contracts.  Fixed or negotiated prices are
frequently used in one to three year contracts.  If the majority of transactions in a commodity are
priced through such negotiations, the fixed price becomes the market price.  Sometimes contract
prices are established by a scale or formula that relates the contract price to various economic
indicators (Buccola and French 1981).9
Indicate the duration of the contract and the way in which it may be terminated and/or
renewed.  Contracts for processing vegetables and field crops are mostly signed on an annual
basis.  Fruit contracts tend to span more than one year (Buccola 1980).
Appoint an arbitrator or otherwise specify how disputes are to be resolved.
Provide an assignment of the contract.
3.2.  Reasons for Contract Farming
An agricultural production and marketing system includes different stages or sectors:  the
suppliers of input items, the farm operator, the processor of farm products, the distributor and
the final consumer.  In the Western World the relationships and transactions between these
sectors could be realized in different manners (Allen 1972):
i.  Spot market or traditional free marketing system which is still accounting for the
lion’s share of the present world marketing system.
ii.  Complete vertical integration as in ownership integration or agricultural cooperatives
and producers groups (e.g., marketing and processing cooperatives, marketing boards and other
producers associations).
iii.  Vertical coordination and contractual relationships.
The first traditional form of market organization and price determination will remain the
appropriate means of coordinating the links in the system if some conditions occur such as:
Production occurs close to the points of final consumption.
Control over short-term variation in prices and sale volumes either through government
or producer organizations.10
Imprecise grading is acceptable to the purchaser or government and producers groups can
set grading standards with sufficient and possibly ever increasing precision as market require-
ments change.
Agricultural extension and advisory services which are running as government functions
are sound and effective.
In a competitive open (free) market system, the hidden hand of the pricing controls the
market mechanism.  The message reflected in price would be passed back to the processor
through the final supply points (supermarkets or groceries) then to the farmer, and to the supplier
of input items.  But this system works very slowly.  This system could be changed by a central-
ized decision-making mechanism, not under a collectivist system, but by the private sector via
group action such as cooperatives or vertical integration changing from contract farming to own-
ership integration.
This contract/integration system is described as the most profound system (Paarlberg
1995).  Organizing under an agricultural cooperative or producers’ group is also a type of
ownership integration.  Sometimes the relationship between the cooperatives or groups and their
members is more of a constitutive than contractual relationship.  It could impose obligations in
respect of production methods, product specification, timing of delivery and so on.  Even if it is
subject to dispute to some extent and needs rather detailed investigation, some empirical evi-
dence shows that contract production between farmers and their own cooperative processing
company has very real consequences.  This was observed in the USA and Turkey.  In the U.S.
sugar industry, a grower-owned processing cooperative appeared in the 1970s (Koening 1995). 
In Turkey, in the 1980s privatization period, some of the sugar industry companies turned to
grower-owned ones, which formerly had been a kind of state enterprise (Rehber 1997).11
The primary motivation for such arrangements is to obtain greater control over the
physical characteristics and quantities of commodities exchanged and to reduce the economic
terms of trade (Buccola and French 1981).
Another main important force behind integration and contract farming are changes in the
market structure.  Well-trained buyers in the market, and the necessity to supply produce with a
certain quality and quantity over time are the main reasons.
It is a fact that production technologies have been improving very rapidly.  Contract
farming is seen as a sound way to push innovation of new technologies and provide more
efficient production.
Establishment of a processing plant needs a big investment and such a firm has high
fixed costs.  An uneven supply of raw material greatly increases unit costs.  Therefore these
firms have an interest in keeping raw material inflows at a steady level close to the plants’
capacity.  Relying on open market purchases is unlikely to achieve this steady raw material flow.
Contract farming is also thought of as a way of commercialization and industrialization
in agriculture.  Contract farming will help the small family farms and farm laborers who need
capital and managerial assistance (Moore 1994).
In short, from the general or industry viewpoint some of the reasons for contracting
include (Roy 1963; Harryman 1994):
The ability to guarantee a required supply of raw material in a timely manner.
The desire to secure products of specific quality standards.
The introduction (expansion) of new technologies to producers, altering or improving
producer management skills.
The reduction of overall firm risks with contracts rather than with ownership integration.12
The control of the costs.
The gaining and improving of market position.
Advantages of contract farming could also be summarized from the producer’s point of
view as follows (Roy 1963; Doye et al. 1992).  The majority of farms are small and subsistent. 
It is commonly recognized that small family farms are potentially an important source of growth
in agricultural production and small scaled agriculture has some socio-economic advantages
(Rehber 1996).  But there are serious constraints on small farm production related to problems of
access to production inputs, services and information.  Small farmers often lack the necessary
production and marketing information particularly about the new crops and varieties.  Even with
sufficient information they do not have enough financial resources and also the credit facilities
are limited mainly because of lack of collateral.  This structure needs to investigate institutional
mechanisms.  Contract farming is an example of such a mechanism that deals with many of these
constraints in an integrated manner.  Government intervention and subsidization policy could be
seen as an alternative to contract farming.  But especially in the developing countries public
interventions and support policies are ineffective and do not help to remove the obstacles men-
tioned above.  Government efforts to subsidize are also mostly in favor of large farmers.  At this
point the “New World Order” of global restructuring of the food industry symbolized by the
GATT and newly established WTO, which are mainly aiming at lessening or cutting agricultural
subsidies, must be considered here.
Besides the reasons mentioned above, recent sophisticated ideas such as environmentally
sound, sustainable and economically viable agriculture are main initiatives behind the fast
growth of contractual arrangements.13
In general, along with a variety of related problems such as delays in delivery or pay-
ment, quality deterioration, etc., which are emerging from the applications, contract farming
generally also has some disadvantages or problems as a production system.
One of the economic factors favoring the increasing use of production contracts is the
need to realize efficiencies through risk management.  But contract farming creates its own risk,
despite reducing others.
i.  For the producer, the failure to produce to contract standards will result in loss of the
contract’s premium prices.  Other risks include the non-renewal or termination of contracts,
perhaps for non-economic reasons.  For the processor, the main risks are the failure to line up
supply, or losing timely receipt of desired quality and quantity of product, loss of technological
advantage, and liability to the producers and to third parties (Kelley 1994).
ii.  The farmer loses his independence to some extent varying with the contract condi-
tions.  That means, the farmer’s management function is transferred to another person.  It is
arguable that a skilled farmer may worsen his circumstances under a contract compared to taking
his chance in an open market.
iii.  It is a fact that contracting is a negotiation between unequal, economically powerful
agri-business and rather weaker farmers.  But farmers can cooperate to gain bargaining power to
ensure fair contract terms.  In the USA, for instance, agricultural bargaining cooperatives have
become an integral part of the marketing system of certain agricultural commodities (Marcus
and Frederick 1994).  By the early 1960s there were more than 325 cooperative bargaining
associations involved in contract negotiation (Allen 1972).  By working together in their coop-
eratives, farmer-members can better control their own economic destiny (Ling and Liebrand
1995).14
iv.  If the integrator has gained a monopsony position, he could abuse his own position to
violate contract provisions in  his  favor.  That means when alternative marketing opportunities
are closed out, an overly integrated firm or sector may beat down the terms of the contract.  Of
course this is not a desirable consequence for improving agricultural marketing.
3. 3.  Success and Failure in Contract Farming
When evaluating success and failure of the contract farming applications and their
outcomes, contractual arrangements might be summed up into two broad categories as private
contract arrangements and outgrower schemes.  The first one is mainly used by the developed
world while the latter one is used in the less developed and developing countries.  Of course
there are some important differences in detail.
First of all the origin of contract farming is so different.  One of the initiatives of contract
farming for developed and for the developing countries to some extent is providing a steady flow
of the raw material to the marketing or processing industry with certain quality standards.  But in
the less-developed world, it was initiated by complementing, occasionally competing with and
partially replacing plantation and estate agriculture or by subsuming independent farmers and
sometimes newly settled families under state or private auspices to produce a variety of products
for domestic consumption and export (Watts 1994).  Therefore contractual relationships have
been appearing as outgrower schemes in developing and less developed countries while it was in
the form of private ones mainly between an individual or a group of farmers and private com-
panies in the developed world.  Hence, while aims and the structure of contract farming are
almost similar and rather definite in the private contract farming system, the outgrower schemes
have a hybrid structure and multiple objectives (Glover 1987).  The reviewed literature reflects15
the tremendous variety of contracting schemes in Africa and Asia regarding both the contracted
parties, social organization of the schemes and the heterogeneity of the contract itself.
The nature of the crops and the technology in use for their production are the most cru-
cial determinants of the success and failure of contract farming in practice.  For instance basic
grains that are not perishable and do not require strict quality or prompt harvesting and
processing do not generally require contracts arrangements (Andrews et al. 1994).  On the other
hand, the perishability and bulkiness of some products requires concentrated production and
careful scheduling and are generally subject to contractual relationships.  For the commodities
for which supplies of both inputs and outputs are inelastic and shifting, and cost is very high,
such as broiler production, contract farming is rather successful.
On the other hand the structure of contract farming has a great variety:  the form it takes
and the attitudes and background of the growers are affected mainly by the availability of other
alternatives and the peculiarities of the political, economic, and social circumstances at the local
and national levels, along with the specialization of the product (Minot 1993).  Therefore, eval-
uation of using contract farming as a way of increasing agricultural productivity, improving
marketing and fostering rural developments cannot be assessed independently from those factors
mentioned above.  Then it can be indicated that the reasons behind success and failure of con-
tract farming in developed, developing and less developed countries are so different depending
on the related infrastructure (Carney et al 1994).
In the developed world, sophisticated market structure, high technology level, farming
structure, and attitudes of the governments create a rather suitable environment for private
contracting arrangements depending on the product features.16
The use of production contracts is increasing in the developed world.  For instance in
U.S. agriculture from 1980 to 1990, the percentage of pigs produced under contract increased
from 2% to 18%.  In 1990 contract production accounted for 7% of food and feed grain produc-
tion and 12% of cotton production.  In the sectors where contract production began, more than
90% of broilers and 80% of processed vegetables are produced under contracts (Kelley 1994).  It
can be realized that in the U.S. the broiler industry is almost entirely vertically coordinated as in
almost all of the developed countries (Vukina and Foster 1996).  Much of the increase in use of
vertical coordination in the U.S. swine industry has taken place through contract production.  A
variety of contractual arrangements are available through feed companies, integrators, genetic
firms and packers.  However little is known about the profitability and risk characteristics of
these alternatives.  One of the researches on this subject suggests that risk neutral producers in
the Midwest would prefer independent production and risk averse producers would prefer to
choose among the various types of coordination arrangements (Johnson and Foster 1994; Rhodes
and Grimes 1993).  In the other developed countries, for example, broiler integration is 23% in
the Korean Republic as compared to 75% in Japan in 1989 (Yi et al. 1993).
In the European Union the production aid system has been encouraging contract farming.
This approach, of course, has a considerable role in the development of contract farming in the
Union.  For instance, one of the observed changes in the Spanish food industry after joining the
EU is the increase of the contractual arrangements.  In Spain the number of farmers involved in
contract farming reached 77,000 in 1988 while it was only 28,000 in 1986 (Erkan et al 1993). 
When the contribution of vertical integration and contract farming to German agriculture was
analyzed, it was concluded that these approaches can result in substantial advantages for coop-
erating farmers but do not automatically improve the competitive position of the parties involved17
(Zurek 1993).  In Germany vertical integration through contract production is already common
in the dairy, poultry and sugar sectors accounting for around 38% of agricultural production. 
Outside these sectors, however, only about 6% of output is produced under contract.  This type
of integration benefits both sides and is likely to continue (Grosskopf 1994).
A study based on the data of the Agricultural Census of Italy shows that contract arrange-
ments are closely associated with farming in all the region and reflect the state and conditions of
agricultural development in each of them.  This suggests that contract farming is a continually
evolving process and also determines that agricultural development is linked to overall develop-
ment and affects the forms that contract farming takes in different areas (Pecci and Lipparini
1993).
In the improved feed sector, the spread of contract farming has accelerated a narrowing
of the genetic base of Western agriculture which has accompanied the development and wide-
spread use of new crop varieties (Burch and Rickson 1990).  Biotechnology companies are also
expected to develop vertical integration by responding to speciality markets and involvement in
contract farming (Shimoda 1994).
Contract farming is offered as a vehicle for the transfer of technology, modernization of
peasant smallholders, and the creation of a stable and politically conservative class of family
farmers.  Overall, contract farming has spread enough in the region that it can be considered a
significant road of capitalist development in agriculture (Clapp et al. 1994).  Contract farming
represents an expanding and much suggested method of agro-industrial integration for develop-
ing economies.  Contract farming is depicted as a method by which agriculture in the developing
world is converging with that in the developed world (Watts 1992).18
In the developing world available infrastructure needs intensive government involvement
and also the financial support of domestic and foreign donor agencies and initiatives of national
and multinational companies.  In the recent two decades there has been a tendency for transna-
tional corporations to shift from land ownership to a contracting system.  This system of coordi-
nation holds great potential for rural development if it can be integrated easily into the national
economy.  In such a structure, agricultural policies which are shaped by public institutions both
at the level of national governments and international organizations are shrinking in importance
and are in the process of being replaced by unregulated, transnational market forces (Nanda
1995).  There is a possibility of exploitation as an unorganized mass of smallholders faces a
single buyer.  Political as well as economic factors are thus of crucial importance in determining
the distribution of benefits resulting from contract farming (Glover 1983).
In the years following World War II, contract farming has been substituted for several
different forms of agricultural production in Latin America.  In Honduras, for example, bananas
once cultivated on corporate plantations, are now grown by associate producers under contract. 
In Peru breweries that once bought barley on the world market are now supplied by contracts
with a network of farmers.
A study based on the experience of seven countries in East and South East Africa with
contract farming and outgrower schemes in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho,
Swaziland and Malawi shows that in most cases, performance in delivering services and provid-
ing income increases to farmers has been quite good, although high management costs limit the
extent to which this form of organization could be more widely applied.  It was concluded that
looser control and relying more on price incentives and farmer participation might lower over-
head costs while developing management capacity among growers (Glover 1990).19
Experiences in the same sub-regions of the world have shown variations.  For example,
the Malaysian schemes appear to be the most successful.  They are long established and increase
in size and number.  The Indonesian schemes are also widespread and active (Glover and Ghee
1992).  But Thailand’s experience is quite the opposite.  Attempts and efforts have failed in
almost every case examined (Manarungsan and Suwangindar 1992).  Both farmers and firms
enjoy greater flexibility, and more production, marketing and ensuring supply options if the
farms are small and have diversified production activities.  Of course, the failures in the related
government policies also have negative impacts on contract farming.  Perhaps the most impor-
tant reason for the success of the Malaysian and Indonesian experiences is the strong and con-
tinuous support provided by government (Ghee and Dorall 1992).
Analysis of the Kenyan experiences has shown that contract farming has the potential to
provide a Pareto-improving form of governance, and it can be used to increase the income avail-
able to the rural sector.  It is a practice which may be engaged in for both efficiency and anti-
competitive motives (Gross 1994).  Also other research shows that contract farming within
smallholder tea production in Kenya has changed family member relations and the role and
stature of women and men in the family (Bulow and Sorensen 1988).
In Swaziland, the Fourth National Development Plan advocates the development of
outgrower schemes based on the example of Vuvulane Irrigated Farms as an alternative strategy
for rural development (Levin 1988).  With reference to tobacco production in Sri Lanka, it is
argued that contract farming can only contribute to meeting basic needs if the income and
employment it generates can be distributed with a measure of efficiency (Kirk 1987).  In the
rapidly growing economies of Southern Asia, besides emergence of processing enterprises which20
meet the diversifying and growing domestic and international demand, contract farming systems
are a feature of the rural growth process.
A research study which was based on case studies of village level processing and market-
ing activities involving soybean, cassava and tobacco in Indonesia illustrates that significant
additional income and employment can accrue to farm producers from such agricultural market-
ing and processing activities at the village level (Kawagoe et al. 1994).  India has become the
second largest producer of fruit and vegetables in the world.  When the facilities to improve this
production potential are discussed, one of the measures suggested is contract farming (Bhatia
1994).
One of the important reasons behind the failure of contract farming is the availability of
other ways of vertical coordination and open market facilities.  This is clearly experienced in the
Turkish hop industry.  In the hop market, there are three marketing alternatives that farmers are
faced with (Rehber 1989).  One private company is trying to grow some amount of raw material
in its own plantation along with contractual relationships with the farmers.  One private com-
pany and the state monopoly are in the market only at harvesting season as buyers with an
advance-paid price system.  There is also a farmers’ cooperative organization as a third alterna-
tive.  In such a structure, despite the favorable offers, the private company could not succeed in
increasing the number of the contractee farmers and its market share over 60% (Rehber 1997).
4.  Structure of Contract Farming
Outgrower schemes have been used mostly in the developing world and have shown a
great variety with their hybrid structure and multiple objectives.  Therefore it is not easy to point
out a standardized form for those schemes.  A simplified model is discussed here for a standard21
(private company scheme) contract production form to have a fair and successful implementa-
tion of contract farming for both sides, the agricultural sector and economy as whole (Figure 1).
First of all both producer/grower and integrators (handler, processor, etc.) must have col-
laboration consciousness.  Both for the producers and processors, it is important to have estab-
lished reputations for honesty and fair dealing.  That means, farmers should look at integrators as
partners who are working for them rather than rivals.  And also the same behavior is expected
from the integrators.  Both sides are in need of each other in order to make a contractual
relationship which operates for their mutual benefits.  Otherwise, this cooperation would be
always a source of dispute and dissatisfaction.
In contract farming systems, the individual producer has perhaps had most reason to feel
weakness in his lack of market power.  However, the history of agricultural producers demon-
strates that growers have been seldom rewarded appropriately in the market place due to weak-
ness in their states as farm entrepreneurs compared with other participants in the food industry. 
That is why it is very important for the producers to act in an organized manner.  Recognition
gained by organized groups is better as opposed to the lack of recognition accorded to unorgan-
ized farm producers (Anderson 1994).  Organizing a bargaining cooperative among farmers
makes them rather powerful in a contracted relationship (Scheid 1991; Moore 1994).  Such an
organization also could give opportunity to collaborate with the integrators’ organization.  The
producers and processors could act together.  For example the California Tomato Growers Asso-
ciation needed to take a more active role in controlling imports.  This led to the formation of
National Association of Growers and Processors for Fair Trade (Marcus and Frederick 1994). 
This attempt was successful in imposing some regulations on imports and in other aspects, such
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Figure 1.  Structure of Contract Farming23
Of course, these local bargaining organizations are to be organized on the national level. 
But in practice, under such organization, the level of negotiation is an arguable problem.  It
could be said that, in general, the collaboration and negotiation between farmers and processors
might be better carried out in a decentralized way, at the firm basis.  A nationwide farmer and
food industry organization could act as an administrative organism.  It could retain a role as
arbitrator and guarantee the application of private agreements.  Experimentation and develop-
ment of reference and agricultural techniques would probably remain the responsibility of the
central body.  Experience in France has shown that, between 1961 and 1990, a considerable shift
had emerged to decentralize the contracted economy from the national level negotiations which
are having difficulty reconciling industrial and marketing coordination (Valceschini 1995).
In contractual arrangements, the role of the integrator firm is so important by determin-
ing most of the production and marketing practices and measures.  Therefore the efficiency of
the firms’ activities directly affect the efficiency of contract farming.  The first step in successful
implementation is the organization of a sound organizational body.  Contracts could vary from
company to company, but all of them must have a special unit which is dealing with all contrac-
tual issues and is equipped with necessary persons and equipment.  And its relationship to the
other functions of the firm must be determined clearly (Brown et al 1994).
The role of government is another important factor for successful application.  The first
function for state authority might be legislative arrangements.  In agriculture, with a tremendous
variety of the production enterprises, it is not possible to put out comprehensive contract models
which have strict rules.  Instead, government could determine a framework for a contract and
enact some regulations to solve disputes and take part in arbitration to some extent.24
Besides this direct role of the government in contractual mechanisms, agricultural sup-
port and intervention policies which aimed, in general, to improve contract farming could be
rather effective and functional.  For instance, in the U.S. for some products the bargaining
strength of farmers is reinforced by marketing orders.  In the European Union, according to the
Commission Regulation, the production aid system is based on contracts between producers and
processors and the particulars to be included in the contracts for the purposes of the aid system
should be specified (Anonymous 1984).
Tax policy is another aspect which must be considered to promote contract farming.
Contract farming is a way of recording systems of production.  Farmers are presently reluctant to
gain on arrangements for fear that they may pay more taxes.  Therefore adopting a tax policy
which facilitates and remedies the situation could be recommended.
On one hand specialization to produce a single product through contract farming has
been increasing the profitability level.  On the other hand, it will increase the risk farmers face. 
Agricultural crop insurance policy could be a considerable way to promote reducing risks for
both farmers and firms.  Ineffective extension and training policies of the governments could be
improved through contract farming.  Credit policies in agriculture also could be realized by
contractual arrangements that consider the contract itself as a collateral.
It is recommended that there should be an independent organization to resolve disputes
between firms and farmers, which are the major causes for failure in contract farming.  For
solving the disagreements and disputes between producers and processors over quality standards,
delays in delivery and payments and default on loans and the like, going through the court sys-
tems created long delays.  Thus an arbitration and/or a conciliation system would  be useful
(Spolter 1992) by involving government and non-governmental organizations’ representatives. 25
In arbitration, an arbitrator renders a decision and a third party imposes it, taking all the control
away from the parties.  But in a conciliation or mediation process, the parties retain control of
the process and the outcome.
4.  Conclusions
Vertical integration or coordination in agriculture has varied from spot market transac-
tions to ownership integration.  One of the worldwide ways of vertical integration is contract
farming.
Of course contract farming is not a panacea to solve all related problems of agricultural
production and marketing systems.  But contract farming could be evaluated as a way of pro-
viding easier access to credit, input, information and technology and product markets for the
small scale farming structure.  Contract farming might also be seen as a way or as a part of rural
development and promoted to improve agricultural performance especially in Third World
countries.  Contract farming could be evaluated as a form of structural convergence between
First and Third World agriculture and also as a way of achieving a higher synthesis between
agriculture and industry.
Contract farming is a continually evolving process.  Worldwide applications of contract
farming have shown that the terms of the contract are shaped in their own conditions and varied
from product to product.  Also each country has its own experiences.
Besides the advantages of contract farming to both sides, it has some disadvantages and
could create some problems, such as losing some measure of independence for the farmer,
creating a monopsony position, etc.  Of course some measures could be taken to outweigh the
advantages of contract farming.  It can be concluded that for successful implementation of26
contract farming, having coordination and collaboration consciousness and acting in an
organized manner are advisable for both sides.  On the other hand, government attitudes and
incentives are also important aspects.27
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